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ABSTRACT 
SEEING AND KNOWING ABILITY OF RHESUS MACAQUES 
 (MACACA MULATTA) 
SEPTEMBER 2007 
CHRISTINE A. MAJOR, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Melinda A. Novak 
 
  
Attribution of knowledge refers to equating a shared visual perspective with shared 
information, a characteristic of human behavior. However, there is considerable debate as 
to whether nonhuman primates understand the significance of gaze and will select a treat 
from an experimenter that looks at them as opposed to one that does not. In previous 
studies, chimpanzees could not differentiate between looking and nonlooking 
experimenters. However, treats were held in the hands, a considerable distance from the 
face. We asked whether a group of five rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) could 
discriminate lookers from nonlookers. We eliminated the problem of focusing on the 
hands by holding treats in close proximity to the experimenters’ eyes.  Monkeys were 
trained to use an apparatus to select an experimenter.  All five subjects were subsequently 
able to discriminate between experimenters holding different food rewards, even when 
these rewards were placed out of the monkey’s view.  Two of the monkeys could also 
select the experimenter who initially held a desirable treat after the treat was hidden and 
iii 
that experimenter changed location. On the seeing and knowing task, two probe types of 
visual occlusion were used: Probe 1- one experimenter turned his head away from the 
monkey, Probe 2- one experimenter covered his eyes with a blindfold. Position, 
experimenter, probe trial, and reward type (on standard trials) were block randomized. 
Data were analyzed using binomial probabilities with α=0.05. At the group level, all five 
monkeys requested food from the experimenter looking at them significantly more than 
would be expected by chance, but individual subject performance differed depending on 
probe condition. These data suggest that some rhesus macaques have the ability to 
understand the connection between seeing and knowing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Attribution of knowledge refers to equating a shared visual perspective with 
shared information, a characteristic of human behavior.  Humans routinely make 
inferences about the knowledge states of other humans based on commonality of 
experience.  Because of their highly social nature and close genetic relationship to 
humans, nonhuman primates might be expected to have this ability. However, there is 
considerable debate as to whether nonhuman primates understand the significance of 
gaze and its relationship to knowledge.  Understanding the role the eyes play in attention 
is an important component to understanding how visual attention equates to an 
underlying mental state.  Most of the research on attribution of knowledge in nonhuman 
primates has focused on great ape species such as chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).  
However, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have also been tested to a lesser degree.  
The majority of the research would seem to suggest that nonhuman primates cannot 
attribute knowledge states to others; however, the methodology of these studies has been 
complicated and problematic.  One major issue with the previous studies was the lack of 
spatial contiguity between the cue given to the animal (experimenter’s eyes) and the 
reward (desirable treat).  The purpose of this project is to investigate the ability of rhesus 
monkeys to attribute knowledge to a human experimenter by examining whether or not 
they use visual information when making choices by substantially modifying the existing 
testing procedure.  This procedure will be discussed in detail later. 
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Gaze Following of Conspecifics 
The process of knowledge attribution requires two skills: the ability to follow the 
gaze of other animals and the ability to infer something about the mental states of other 
animals.  Burkart and Heschl (2006) define simple gaze following as the visual co-
orientation of one individual to another.  Extensive research suggests that as in humans, 
gaze following is a widespread trait in nonhuman mammals having been documented in 
several species of nonhuman primates such as chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta), stumptailed macaques (Macaca arctoides), pigtailed 
macaques (Macaca nemestrina) and sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys torquatus)   
(Tomasello, Call, and Hare, 1998), and even in some non-primate species such as 
domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) (Hare & Tomasello, 1999) and mountain goats (Capra 
hircus) (Kaminski, Riedel, Call, and Tomasello, 2005). According to Burkart & Heschl 
(2006), “the ability to follow gaze has adaptive value” because it allows an individual to 
gain information about the environment, as well as the activities of other organisms by 
visually attending to a stimulus that a conspecific is focused on.  Possessing the ability to 
follow the gaze of others would benefit social living non-human primates for several 
reasons. Tracking another animal’s gaze may reduce aggressive encounters or predation 
and may facilitate mating or finding food.   
The ability of nonhuman primates to follow the gaze of conspecifics has been 
studied using different methods but generally nonhuman primates appear to passively 
follow gaze.  It should be noted that animals that follow the gaze of others are most likely 
using a combination of cues including eyes, head orientation, and body posture.  
Tomasello, Call and Hare (1998) showed that several non-human primate species can 
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follow a conspecific’s gaze to an object.  The species tested were: chimpanzees, rhesus 
macaques, stumptailed macaques, pigtail macaques and sooty mangabeys.  The procedure 
involved an experimenter holding an orange (a desirable treat) located in a tower above 
the subjects.  After the attention of one animal was directed upward at the experimenter, 
observers scored whether or not a nearby animal noticed the gaze cue and looked up.  
Across all species tested, animals that noticed another animal looking up would also look 
up reliably more than in the control conditions, in which the food was displayed in the 
same way, but the subject was by itself considerably apart from others in the group.  
Tomasello et al. (1998) concluded that all five species were able to detect and follow a 
conspecific’s gaze and also that there was no difference in gaze following ability between 
the ape and monkey species.   
Using different methods, Emery, Lorincz, Perrett, Oram, and Baker (1997) 
examined the capacity for gaze following as well as joint attention in rhesus monkeys.  
The authors differentiate these abilities by explaining that gaze following is the tracking 
of direction of gaze of one animal by another to a location in space while joint attention is 
the co-orienting of two animals’ gaze to an object.  In order to investigate these two 
abilities, videotaped clips of a rhesus monkey (stimulus monkey) were shown to the 
subjects: first alone (just the monkey looking in a particular direction) and then along 
with two target objects (monkey looking at one of the target objects). Rhesus monkey 
observers followed the gaze of the stimulus monkey in the absence of the targets and also 
looked more frequently at the particular object that the stimulus monkey was looking at 
than the other object.   
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In both studies, the subjects not only received information about gaze, but also 
changes in head orientation and body posture.  Although it is not clear which of these 
cues are most important in eliciting gaze following, it is obvious that many non-human 
primate species are able to use a combination of gaze-oriented cues from conspecifics in 
order to attend to particular locations or objects in their environment.   
 Gaze Following of Human Experimenters 
If an animal has the ability to follow the gaze of a conspecific the next question 
we may ask is: does this ability extend to other organisms?  For example, will a non-
human primate attend to the gaze of a human?  Several species of nonhuman primates 
have been tested to see whether or not they would follow a human experimenter’s gaze.  
Many nonhuman primate species will follow a human experimenter’s gaze; however, 
there are some conflicting results for certain species such as monkeys (Itakura, 1996; 
Tomasello, Hare, & Fogleman, 2001).   
Itakura (1996) tested the gaze-monitoring ability of chimpanzees and one 
orangutan.  After obtaining eye contact with an ape, a human experimenter then looked 
right, left, or behind the subject.  Each direction of gaze was also paired with a pointing 
gesture for some trials. The orangutan reliably followed the experimenter’s gaze and the 
chimpanzees followed the experimenter’s gaze only when it was paired with a pointing 
gesture.  However, it is important to note that the chimpanzees were socially housed 
during testing and the orangutan was tested alone.    
In contrast, Tomasello, Hare, and Fogleman (2001) later showed that infant and 
juvenile chimpanzees were able to follow a human experimenter’s gaze without the use 
of gestural cues. The study procedure involved an experimenter who approached a 
 5 
chimpanzee’s enclosure (the apes were separated from their social groups for testing) and 
administered trials of two different types: control and experimental.  The control trials 
consisted of the experimenter looking directly at the chimpanzee.  During the 
experimental trials, the experimenter looked up into the air by lifting her head.  Both trial 
types involved the experimenter’s body facing towards the chimpanzee.  Chimpanzees 
from several age groups reliably followed the experimenter’s gaze and looked up more 
often in the experimental condition than in the control condition.   
Because the chimpanzees were tested individually, any distractions by group 
members were eliminated and this methodological difference may have accounted for the 
chimpanzees’ success during this study, as compared to their failure to follow an 
experimenter’s gaze without a pointing cue in Itakara’s 1996 study.  Even when overt 
aggression is not observed, the performance of nonhuman primate subordinates on 
cognitive tasks can be affected by the presence of dominant group members (Drea, 1998; 
Drea & Wallen, 1999). 
The gaze following abilities of several monkey and prosimian species have also 
been tested.  Using the same procedure as described above for chimpanzees and an 
orangutan (see Itakura, 1996), rhesus monkeys, pigtailed macaques, stumptailed 
macaques, tonkean monkeys, squirrel monkeys, white-faced capuchins, brown capuchins, 
brown and black lemurs were all tested to see whether or not they would follow a human 
experimenter’s gaze.  All animals were tested in their familiar enclosures with their social 
groups.  None of the animals from any species responded during a trial in which the 
experimenter was simply gazing in one direction.  However, when an animal did respond 
when gaze was paired with pointing (by looking right or left) it was in the correct 
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direction significantly more than the incorrect direction.  Two concerns are raised with 
this study: 1) the animals were once again tested in their social groups which could have 
affected their performance and 2) the rates of no response were high (~45-90% of trials) 
suggesting that the animals may not have been interested in the testing procedure.    
In contrast, Tomasello et al. (2001) using the procedure described for 
chimpanzees (see above) found that rhesus monkeys reliably followed the experimenter’s 
gaze.  As with the chimpanzees, all monkeys were tested individually.  This 
methodological aspect may account for the difference in results found between this study 
and Itakara’s 1996 study.   
Evidence for gaze following ability has also been shown in a species of New 
World monkey, common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) (Burkart & Heschl, 2006).  In 
this study, one experimenter stood in front of the marmoset’s cage (individuals were 
separated for the study) and either looked up towards the ceiling or to the left while 
keeping his/her body position facing the cage.  Marmosets looked more frequently and 
for longer durations in the same direction as the experimenter than for other directions.  
Gaze following was evident for both the looking up and looking left conditions.  
Gaze Following as a cue for problem solving 
In general, it appears that both apes and monkeys can follow a human 
experimenter’s gaze.  The next step is to determine whether or not nonhuman primates 
can use an experimenter’s gaze as a cue to solve a task.  Results are mixed on such 
studies (Anderson, Montant, & Schmit, 1996; Anderson, Sallaberry, & Barbier, 2001; 
Itakura, Agnetta, Hare and Tomasello, 1999; Itakara & Tanaka, 1998).  
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Itakura and Tanaka (1998) investigated the ability of two chimpanzees to use 
several different cues given by an experimenter to find the correct location of a hidden 
food reward in an object-choice task (OCT).  There were two objects, and the food 
reward was hidden randomly beneath one of the objects out of view of the chimpanzee.  
Five separate cue conditions were used to indicate the “correct” object: 1) tapping with a 
finger on the object (location of reward); 2) pointing to the object; 3) head and eyes 
oriented toward object (short distance); 4) head and eyes oriented toward object (further 
distance); and 5) eyes only oriented toward object.  Both chimpanzees solved the task in 
all five cue conditions.  The ability of chimpanzees to use cues to locate a hidden food 
reward was also demonstrated in a subsequent study by Itakura, Agnetta, Hare and 
Tomasello (1999).  The chimpanzees had to choose between two containers: one that was 
baited and one that was not (randomized across trials).  The cues given by the 
experimenter were: looking toward the location of the baited food container (while 
crouching down close to the container) and looking and pointing to the hidden food 
location (while standing between both containers).  Three of the four chimpanzees 
selected the correct container more often than the non-baited container when there was 
close proximity between the experimenter and the baited food container (e.g., crouching).  
However, only one chimpanzee performed above chance level when the distance between 
the experimenter and the food container was increased (e.g., standing).  Given the 
experimental setup, it is impossible to determine whether poor performance was due to 
increased distance between the experimenter and the reward or to the addition of pointing 
which may have confused the chimpanzees.  
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Rhesus monkeys were given an OCT, which required them to use experimenter-
given cues (Anderson, Montant, & Schmit, 1996).  The cue conditions given by the 
experimenter were: 1) looking at the correct location, 2) looking and pointing at the 
correct location, and 3) only pointing at the correct location.  Looking by itself was not 
sufficient to induce a correct response.  However, rhesus monkeys responded 
significantly better than chance when looking was combined with pointing and when 
pointing was used alone.  It appeared that the monkeys were not using the experimenter’s 
gaze direction and head orientation in order to choose the correct baited food well.  A 
subsequent study more thoroughly differentiated pointing from looking leading to the 
conclusion that the gaze of the experimenter alone was not a sufficient cue, but the 
gestural cue of pointing was (Anderson et al., 1996).  Pointing of a human experimenter 
as a cue has been used in other experiments with varied results. Hess, Novak & Povinelli, 
(1993) demonstrated that one rhesus macaque was unable to use the pointing gesture of a 
human experimenter in order to select a correct food cup in a role reversal task.    
Using the same procedure as described above Anderson, Sallaberry, and Barbier 
(1995) tested capuchin monkeys on an OCT.  The performance of the capuchin monkeys 
was similar to that of the rhesus monkeys.  Gaze cues alone were not sufficient for 
capuchins to perform above chance on the OCT whereas gaze cues paired with pointing 
and pointing alone enabled capuchins to reliably select the correct location of a hidden 
food object. 
Marmosets were also given a standard object choice task OCT that required the 
use of experimenter gaze (Burkart & Heschl, 2006).  However, marmosets were unable to 
use the experimenter’s gaze in order to make a choice.  However, when the OCT was 
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modified to include several containers, in contrast to the original two, and the subject was 
allowed to investigate up to two containers; the marmosets’ performance improved.  Also 
modified in this experiment were the cues given by the experimenter, they included: 1) 
touching the baited container, 2) pointing at the baited container from varied distances, 3) 
facing the baited container with head and eyes, and 4) looking at the baited container with 
the eyes while keeping the head straight.  In almost all cue conditions, the marmosets 
performed significantly above chance.  The lowest scores were found in the head and 
eyes and eyes only conditions, presumably the most difficult conditions.  However, the 
same marmosets were used for all experiments, and although the exact number of trials 
an animal received was not specified, each received at least 200 trials.  One possibility 
could have been that the marmosets were merely learning a search strategy after 
receiving a large number of trials.    
One possible explanation for the poor performance of some non-human primate 
species on specific aspects of gaze-related tests could be that although the animal 
understands attention as an internal mental state, it may still lack the ability to understand 
how it is deployed by the eyes (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a).  Therefore, an animal may 
incorrectly attend to some other feature of the experimenter other than the eyes in order 
to make a choice on a task.  An important consideration in methodology brought up by 
OCT-tasks is the proximity of the cue to the stimulus. For example, in the looking only 
condition of the capuchin monkey study (Anderson et al., 1995), the experimenter’s eyes 
were significantly farther away from the correct location (as marked by an object on top 
of the baited food well) than the experimenter’s hand in the pointing conditions.  It has 
been previously shown that spatial contiguity of cue and reward has a profound effect on 
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the performance of rhesus monkeys during cognitive tasks, specifically discrimination 
tasks that involve the use of the Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus (WGTA) 
(McClearn & Harlow, 1954; Meyer, Polidora, & McConnell, 1961; Miller & Murphy, 
1964; Murphy & Miller, 1955). Murphy & Miller (1955) used the original WGTA, in 
which the response blocks and the cues placed on top of them were both located over the 
food wells, to test rhesus monkeys on a simple discrimination task.  Animals were able to 
learn the discrimination task quickly (within approximately 50 trials) when all three 
components of the task were placed together.  However, when the cues and response 
blocks were placed on a shelf six inches above the food wells, the same animals 
performed poorly.  It was evident that the larger the separation between cue and reward, 
the poorer the performance of an animal on the task.  
Seeing as a Mental State of Attention (Selecting experimenters that are looking versus 
not looking at the primate) 
 As discussed previously, experimental evidence supports the notion that 
chimpanzees, as well as other non-human primate species, are able to follow gaze 
direction of both conspecifics and human experimenters.  In some cases, nonhuman 
primates can use the gaze of humans to discriminate between objects.  However, it is less 
clear whether or not they interpret gaze as a mental state of attention.  Negative results 
for chimpanzees were obtained from a study by Povinelli & Eddy (1996b), in which the 
apes did not appear to understand the correlation between seeing and the internal state of 
attention.  Chimpanzees learned to choose between two experimenters, selecting the one 
holding a treat as opposed to another experimenter holding a non-treat item.  On probe 
trials, chimpanzees were exposed to two experimenters both holding a desirable treat; 
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however, only one of the experimenters looked in the direction of the chimpanzee 
whereas the other experimenter had his vision occluded.  Visual occlusion was achieved 
by four different conditions in which: 1) a bucket was placed over the head; 2) a blindfold 
covered the eyes; 3) the experimenter turned his back to the subject; and 3) both hands 
covered the eyes.  Only after several trials were the chimpanzees able to pick the correct 
experimenter (the one who could see them).  However, it seemed that the subjects’ 
success was due to rule-based learning concerning simply the presence of a face or eyes, 
and not the role of the eyes in attention (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b).  
 The same chimpanzees were re-tested in a study comprised of three experiments 
using different experimenter conditions (Povinelli, & Eddy, 1996a).  In the first 
experiment, one experimenter actively tried to engage the subject in direct eye contact 
whereas the other experimenter focused downward on a response hole.  A response hole 
was a hole cut into the Plexiglas panel that separated the chimpanzees from the 
experimenters.  Each experimenter had a response hole in front of him/her in which the 
chimpanzee could reach through and gesture toward that particular experimenter.  The 
chimpanzees gestured more often in front of the experimenter who made direct eye 
contact with them suggesting that the chimpanzees were attending to the subtle 
differences between the two experimenters’ eye direction.  
 Experiment two was concerned with discrimination of the experimenter based on 
head orientation and movement as compared to presence and orientation of eyes.  
Specifically, it was investigated whether or not a small rotation of the experimenter’s 
head (a motion employed in order to mimic a species-typical behavior observed while 
chimpanzees are visually monitoring) along with or without the closing of the 
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experimenter’s eyes would affect performance during testing.  This experiment consisted 
of two conditions: Condition A, in which both experimenters displayed the head rotation 
with their eyes open but only one made direct eye contact with the subject (correct 
experimenter), and Condition B, which involved both experimenters displaying the head 
rotation with one experimenter closing his/her eyes while the other made eye contact with 
the subject (correct experimenter).  For Condition A, the chimpanzees’ performance 
approached statistical significance; however, their performance on Condition B did not.  
It appeared that the chimpanzees were making indiscriminate choices when faced with 
two experimenters exhibiting the same movements.   
Finally, in the third experiment the researchers attempted to further tease apart 
which aspects of the human experimenters the subjects were actually processing.  Four 
different testing conditions were designed to examine how head rotation, head position, 
eye contact, and eye direction would affect the subjects’ performance.  The results of this 
third experiment suggest that for chimpanzees, head rotation, in the form of a species-
typical back and forth movement, and head orientation are more salient cues in 
determining another’s attentional state than direct eye contact or eye orientation.  
However, the question of whether or not chimpanzees are able to understand attention as 
a mental state or if they simply attend to obvious behavioral cues associated with 
attention is still unanswered (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a).   
A later study investigated the ability of chimpanzees to interact with a human 
experimenter who was attending (eyes, head, and body posture) to and manipulating 
either a desirable food reward or a distracter object (Povinelli, Theall, Reaux, & Dunphy-
LeLii, 2003).  Relying on the use of a begging gesture commonly exhibited by 
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chimpanzees, the question was posed whether the chimpanzees would gesture more 
toward where the experimenter was focused or simply toward the food reward. It was 
assumed that if the chimpanzees had an understanding of the properties of attention, they 
would understand that they must elicit the attention of the experimenter in order to 
receive the reward. The subjects gestured in such a way that suggested they were able to 
perceive where the experimenter was focused, which enabled them to vary their gestures 
accordingly.  The same subjects were tested again six months later using the same 
methods with the exception that the experimenter was no longer manipulating the objects, 
but was looking and slightly leaning towards one or the other.  Once again, the 
chimpanzees gestured in a similar manner as they had in the previous experiment.  It was 
apparent that even when the experimenter’s head orientation was less obvious, the 
subjects were still able to recognize and respond to it (Povinelli et al., 2003).  Overall, it 
seems that chimpanzees are able to attend to the necessary cues provided by a human 
experimenter in order to determine what that experimenter perceives.  These findings 
suggest that chimpanzees may have an understanding that visual focus equates to the 
mental state of attention.         
  Attribution of Knowledge 
 Thus far, the focus has been on whether nonhuman primates can follow gaze and 
even use information about visual gaze to select objects or elicit treats from 
experimenters.  Previous research suggests that most nonhuman primate species can 
follow a conspecific’s gaze as well as a human experimenter’s gaze.  However, it seems 
that when asked to use a human experimenter’s gaze as a cue in order to solve a task, 
several species encounter difficulty.  Chimpanzees, in contrast, are not only able to use 
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gaze as a cue to solve a task, but may also understand the relationship between gaze and 
the underlying state of attention.  This ability is a necessary precursor to attribution of 
knowledge, which requires an understanding of the causal connection between seeing and 
knowing (Povinelli, Parks, and Novak, 1991). This attribution ability is difficult to 
characterize in non-human primates through cognitive testing.  However, the guesser-
knower paradigm has been the testing method of choice (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b; 
Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990; Povinelli, Parks, & Novak, 1991).  This test requires 
a subject to discriminate between two experimenters: the knower, who has witnessed or 
has executed the baiting of a container in the presence of a nonhuman primate (hence 
there is a shared visual perspective), and the guesser, who is unaware of the treat’s 
location.  The guesser may have either left the room during baiting or covered his/her 
head and or eyes.  Each experimenter then points to a food cup, with the knower always 
pointing to the correct cup and the guesser always pointing to an incorrect cup.  This 
paradigm was used to test the ability of four chimpanzees to make inferences about the 
knowledge states of two experimenters (Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen, 1990).  During 
the experiment, the knower baited a food cup while the guesser exited the room.  As 
described above, the chimpanzees were able to watch the baiting (shared visual 
perspective) but were not able to see which cup was baited.  The guesser then re-entered 
the room and both experimenters pointed to a cup.  After several weeks of testing, all four 
chimpanzees reliably learned to select the knower.  In a variant of this task, the guesser 
did not leave the room but instead put a bag over his/her head to occlude his/her vision.  
Three of the four chimpanzees continued to select the knower significantly more than the 
guesser in this condition.  The results of this study give support to the idea that 
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chimpanzees are able to take into account what another being has or has not seen in order 
to make inferences about his/her knowledge state (Povinelli et al., 1990).   
In contrast, rhesus monkeys tested using the same guesser-knower paradigm did 
not appear to discriminate between guessers and the knowers (Povinelli, Parks, and 
Novak, 1991).  In the condition in which the guesser left the room during baiting, four 
rhesus monkeys were unable to reliably select the knower.  Even after attempts were 
made to train the monkeys using a red hat worn always by the knower, their performance 
was still around chance level.  The monkeys were then tested using a modified procedure 
in which the knower watched the baiting, done by a third experimenter, while the guesser 
put a bag over his/her head.  Once again, the performance of the subjects was poor.  It 
was then postulated that when it came time to respond, monkeys were only attending to 
the hands of the experimenters pointing to the cups (Povinelli et al., 1991).  This problem 
of contiguity is similar to those encountered during the previously mentioned OCT’s.  In 
attempt to test this theory of a lack of cue contiguity, one experimenter wore a pink glove 
at all times.  For one monkey, it was always the knower, for another, it was randomized.  
The monkey who was exposed to the knower always wearing the pink glove appeared to 
learn to distinguish the guesser from the knower; however, the other monkey, who was 
exposed to either the guesser or the knower randomly wearing the pink glove, did not.  
Although moving the artificial cue (pink glove) closer to where the monkeys had to 
respond did improve performance, it appeared that they did not have an understanding of 
the information possessed by the knower (Povinelli et al., 1991).  However, the addition 
of the colored glove did not solve the problem of contiguity between the cue and reward 
because the cue was actually the experimenters’ eyes and not their hands.  Therefore, this 
 16 
cue might have reinforced the monkeys’ tendency to focus down on the task to the 
experimenters’ hands and not where the experimenters were looking.   We have now 
examined the various seeing and knowing- related skills of several species.  For a 
summary of these abilities see Table 1.   
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Species Presence of 
Ability 
Gaze 
Following 
(conspecifics) 
Gaze Following 
(human 
experimenters) 
Use of Gaze as a 
Cue 
Seeing as a 
Mental State of 
Attention 
Attribution of 
Knowledge 
YES 
Tomasello et al., 
1998 
Itakura 1996* 
Tomasello et al., 2001 
Itakura and Tanaka, 
1998 
Itakura et al., 1999 
Povinelli, & Eddy, 
1996a 
Povinelli, et al., 2003 
Povinelli et al., 1990 Pan troglodytes 
(chimpanzees) 
NO    Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b 
 
YES  Itakura, 1996*  
  
Pongo 
pygmaeous 
(orangutans) NO      
YES 
Tomasello et al., 
1998 
Emery et al., 
1997 
Tomasello et al., 2001 Anderson et al., 
1996* 
  
Macaca mulatta 
(rhesus 
macaques) 
NO  
 
Itakura 1996 Hess et al., 1993 
 
Povinelli et al., 1991 
YES Tomasello et al., 1998     
Macaca 
nemestrina 
(pigtailed 
macaques) NO 
 
 
 
Itakura 1996 
   
YES Tomasello et al., 1998     
Macaca 
arctoides 
(stumptailed 
macaques) NO 
 
 
 
Itakura 1996    
YES   Anderson et al., 1995* 
  Cebus apella 
(brown 
capuchins) NO  
 
    
YES 
Tomasello et al., 
1998 
 
    Cercocebus atys 
torquatus 
(sooty 
mangabeys) 
 
NO 
     
YES  Burkart & Heschl, 2006 
Burkart & Heschl, 
2006* 
  Callithrix 
jacchus 
(common 
marmosets) NO 
  
 
  
Table 1 Presence or absence of related abilities.*Indicates success when gaze was paired with a pointing cue. 
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Current Study 
 The findings from the aforementioned previous research suggest that whereas 
chimpanzees may under some circumstances have a concept of seeing and knowing; that 
is, understanding attention as a mental state and consequently attributing knowledge 
states to others, rhesus monkeys do not.  However, an alternate possibility for the rhesus 
monkeys is that they possess this ability but need greater contiguity between the treat and 
the face in order to solve both “seeing as a mental state” tasks and attribution of 
knowledge tasks.  During previously described testing methods, the distance between the 
cue (experimenter’s eyes) and reward (desirable treat) may have been too large and 
therefore may have resulted in the animals focusing on the hand holding the treat instead 
of the experimenter’s eyes.  If the animals were focusing down on the task, as rhesus 
monkeys have been previously shown to do (McClearn & Harlow; 1954; Meyer, 
Polidora, & McConnell, 1961; Miller, & Murphy, 1964; Murphy, & Miller, 1955), their 
apparent random selection of an experimenter can be explained.  If this is the case, the 
testing procedure should be set up to decrease the distance between the cue and the 
reward.  The current study was designed to examine seeing as a mental state by creating a 
task in which the experimenters held the food reward in close proximity to their eyes.  
This methodological change eliminated the possibility of the animals ignoring the 
experimenter’s face and focusing solely on the experimenter’s hand.   
This study was divided into two parts: 1) developing and testing an apparatus that 
enabled monkeys to choose between two experimenters, and 2) determining whether 
decreased distance between the reward and the face would improve performance on a 
seeing and knowing task.  In part one, monkeys were trained to pull a knob or cup to 
  19 
signify the selection of one experimenter over another.  We expected monkeys to highly 
prefer an experimenter holding a treat rather than an experimenter holding a piece of 
chow (the particular experimenter that held the treat was randomly determined on each 
trial). The monkeys’ understanding of this choice was further explored by showing the 
treat and then hiding it (memory) and by hiding the treat and shifting the location of the 
experimenters prior to choosing (to determine whether the monkeys tracking the treat 
position or the experimenter). 
In part two, the procedure described above was used to test the monkeys’ ability 
to discriminate between an experimenter looking in their direction as opposed to one that 
was not.  The monkeys were exposed to standard trials (two experimenters looking at the 
monkey, one holding a treat, the other a piece of chow) and probe trials used to test 
whether monkeys would select an experimenter looking at them.  In the probe trials, both 
experimenters held the same treats but only one was looking in the direction of the 
monkey.   
Our hypothesis was that rhesus monkeys can choose between different 
experimenters and have the ability to understand the causal connection between seeing 
and knowing.   
We predicted the following: 
1) Monkeys will select the experimenter that holds the treat over the experimenter 
that holds the chow. 
2) Monkeys will remember who held the treat and select that experimenter. 
3) Monkeys will remember who held the treat even when the location of the 
experimenter is shifted after the treat is hidden. 
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4) Monkeys will differentiate between an experimenter looking at them as opposed 
to one that does not even though both hold a treat.   
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 The purpose of this experiment was to develop an experimenter choice paradigm 
wherein monkeys selected an experimenter to give them a food reward.  We then looked 
at the limits of what the monkeys understood by making a choice.  We trained monkeys 
to use a box apparatus to select an experimenter holding a food reward.  We then 
determined if monkeys would choose between experimenters on the basis of the treat 
they held (treat vs. a piece of their normal monkey chow).  We then imposed a memory 
constraint to see if the monkeys could remember the experimenter who had held the treat 
as opposed to the piece of chow.  The treats were placed out of view before the monkeys 
could make a selection.  Finally, we determined whether the monkeys were tracking the 
treat or the actual experimenter.  We removed the experimenters’ location as a possible 
cue by having the experimenters switch locations on some trials (probes) after hiding the 
treat.  This experiment not only required the monkeys to remember which experimenter 
had last held the treat, but also, on the probe trials, track that experimenter to a new 
location.  If the monkeys understood that in order to receive the desirable treat they had 
to select the experimenter that had last held it, we predicted that they would choose the 
correct experimenter.  However, if the monkeys were merely using location cues (i.e., the 
last location they saw the treat in) instead of tracking the experimenter, we predicted they 
would choose the incorrect experimenter on the switching trials.       
Subjects 
 The subjects were nine rhesus macaques, six females and three males, housed at 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Primate Facility.  All of these animals were 
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born and raised in captivity.  Five monkeys, ZA56, ZA65, V27, V43, and V38 were 
surrogate-peer reared at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Poolesville, Maryland.  
At approximately, one year of age, they were transferred to the UMass Primate Facility 
and at the time of study ranged in age from 4-6 years.  Four other monkeys were mother-
reared. N02 and J04 were both born at the UMass Primate Lab. The remaining two 
monkeys, 3E2 and 6NS, were received from the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School (see Table 2 for the sex, ages, and rearing history of all nine subjects).  All of the 
monkeys had extensive previous experience with cognitive testing; and two of the 
animals were previously involved in a gaze following study.   
 
Table 2 Detailed subject information. 
Housing 
 The monkeys were housed indoors, under various housing situations.  Four 
monkeys were housed in two groups of pairs: 3E2 with 6NS in a quad cage (Figure 1) 
and ZA56 with ZA65 in an Allentown cage (Figure 2). V27, V43, V38 and J04 were all 
housed individually in floor-to-ceiling pens measuring 1.83m by 2.44m by 1.22m. N02 
was housed in a large floor-to-ceiling pen measuring 1.83m by 1.83m by 1.22m with her 
mother and infant brother, both of whom were not used in this study. N02 was tested in a 
Subject # Subject 
Name 
Sex Age Origin Rearing Condition 
J04 BamBam M 21 UMass Primate Facility Mother-reared 
6NS Thelma F 20 UMass Med. Unknown 
3E2 Louise F 19 UMass Med. Unknown 
V27 Ivan M 8 NIH Surrogate-peer-reared 
V38 Taz F 8 NIH Surrogate-peer-reared 
V43 Cobe M 8 NIH Surrogate-peer-reared 
ZA56 Zoey F 5 NIH Surrogate-peer-reared 
ZA65 Kayla F 5 NIH Surrogate-peer-reared 
N02 Lilly F 2 UMass Primate Facility Mother-reared 
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smaller holding cage permanently attached to a large pen that made up her homecage 
(Figure 3).  A wood chip substrate was used as bedding in the pens.  All monkeys were 
tested separately in their home-cages, as it has been shown that animals perform better on 
cognitive tasks in these familiar environments.    
Figure 1 3E2 & 6NS Quad cage.      Figure 2 ZA56 & ZA65 Allentown cage. 
 
Figure 3 N02 Holding cage. 
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The monkeys were fed a standard diet of Purina monkey chow twice a day and 
had constant access to water bottles. Their cages were cleaned twice a day, once in the 
morning and once in the afternoon.  The subjects were maintained on a 13-11 light:dark 
cycle.  The average daily temperature in the room was approximately 23 ْC.  They were 
given enrichment in the form of toys and foraging apparatuses as well as treats such as 
fruits, vegetables, and grains.   
Apparatus 
 
 Two familiarization phases were designed to allow rhesus macaques to become 
familiar with a new communication apparatus.  The apparatus was an adapted version of 
a device originally used to study social communication in rhesus macaques (Mason & 
Hollis, 1962), which was later modified by Povinelli et al. (1990, 1991) to examine 
visual-perspective taking and attribution of knowledge in chimpanzees. This apparatus 
consisted of two wooden boxes, each with a knob that could be pulled as a means of 
selection.  The dimensions of each identical box were: 52.71cm by 25.40cm by 21.59cm 
(Figure 4). Each box had an experimenter standing behind it, and when an animal pulled 
the knob of a box it represented the selection of the experimenter standing directly behind 
that box along with whatever treat that experimenter held or controlled. 
  Depending on which cage an animal was housed in, the boxes were elevated by 
placement on either: one of two rolling carts (77.47cm by 64.77cm by 107.95cm or 
60.96cm by 45.72cm by 45.72cm) or a fixed plastic unit (36.83cm by 31.75 by 60.96cm) 
with a sheet of Plexiglas covering it.  Although the apparatus was at a different height 
depending on an animal’s homecage, the experimenters’ position with respect to the 
boxes was relatively the same with the experimenter’s head at the same distance from the 
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boxes.  The experimenters faced the animal with their hand near their faces.  The 
animal’s selection and whether or not they accepted the treat handed to them was 
recorded by one of the experimenters on a data sheet at the end of each trial.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Apparatus used by animal to select an experimenter.   
 
Data Analysis 
 All data in this study were analyzed using binomial probabilities to determine 
whether or not an animal selected the correct experimenter significantly more than would 
be expected by chance.  When presented with the apparatus (2 boxes) with one 
experimenter behind each box, an animal had a 50% chance of choosing the correct 
experimenter.  An alpha level of 0.05 was the criterion for significant results.  
 
Familiarization Procedure 
Box Familiarization Phase (Pulling Knobs)   
 The purpose of this phase was to familiarize the monkeys to pulling the knob on 
the box.  Each monkey was exposed to a box in front of its cage with the knob facing the 
animal. The box was then pushed within reach of the animal.  The monkey was allowed 
to contact the box for five minutes.  To encourage exploration of the apparatus, the box 
was initially baited with small treats on the top and on the knob.  The experimenter 
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subsequently attempted to shape the pulling response by reinforcing the monkey for 
contact with the knob. The number of contacts and the area of contact were recorded by 
an observer.  If, after the five-minute period, the animal had not pulled the knob, it 
received a demonstration, in which the experimenter pulled the knob four times.  After 
the demonstration period, the animal was given another five-minute period in which 
apparatus contacts were scored in the same manner as the first five-minute period.  
Several animals (3E2, 6NS, ZA56, ZA65, and N02) readily pulled the knob with our 
shaping procedure whereas others required a demonstration (J04, V27, V43 and V38).  
One animal learned to pull the cup attached to the sliding mechanism on the top of the 
box instead of pulling the knob.  This response was also counted as a selection method 
and the animal was moved on to the next phase.   
Box Reinforcement Phase 
 The purpose of this phase was to familiarize the monkeys to the presence of the 
experimenter behind the box holding a treat and to the association that pulling the knob 
would lead to the experimenter giving the animal the treat. The monkey was presented 
with one box in the same manner as Phase 1.  However, in this phase, five trials per 
session were given in which the subject had to pull the knob or the cup of the box to 
receive a treat handed to it by an experimenter. The experimenter standing behind the box 
held the treat in close proximity his/her eyes.  The other experimenter scored all knob or 
cup pulls as well as whether or not the animal accepted the treat handed to it.  Once the 
monkeys reached criterion (pulling the knob or cup for all five trials in a session, for five 
consecutive sessions), they were then moved on to Experiment 1. 
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 Six out of the nine monkeys successfully completed all phases of familiarization 
(p≤0.05, for five consecutive sessions). 3E2, 6NS, ZA56, ZA65, V38 and N02 all learned 
to use the apparatus to make a selection response, either by pulling the knob on the front 
of the box or the cup attached to the sliding mechanism on top of the box. The youngest 
animal, N02, was the only monkey to use the latter selection method, presumably because 
she lacked the muscle strength to pull the knob. All monkeys who completed 
familiarization learned only one method of selection and continued to use only that 
method during all experiments.  The remaining three monkeys, J04, V27, and V43, were 
eventually dropped from the study after each failed to complete familiarization, even 
after being given additional sessions which included several demonstration periods.  
Failure was categorized as the refusal to make a response or to attempt to contact the 
apparatus for at least five consecutive sessions.  For detailed information see Table 3.  
 
Subject Completed 
Familiarization 
Selection 
Method Used 
# of  Box 
Familiarization 
Sessions 
# of Box 
Reinforcement 
Sessions 
6NS Yes Knob pull 3 13 
3E2 Yes Knob pull 3 13 
ZA56 Yes Knob pull 5 6 
ZA65 Yes Knob pull 5 6 
N02 Yes Cup pull 2 6 
V38           Yes Knob pull 16 14 
J04 No N/A 25 -- 
V27 No N/A 11 -- 
V43 No N/A 10 -- 
Table 3 Detailed subject performance information for Familiarization.   
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Experimental Procedure 
Experiment 1a (Testing experimenter selection and preferential selection of a treat) 
This phase was implemented to determine whether monkeys would choose 
between two experimenters by using the apparatus.  It also tested whether or not they 
preferred a food treat over a piece of their normal monkey chow using this apparatus.  
The animal was presented with two boxes simultaneously for the first time.  Two 
experimenters were involved in this phase, and each stood behind one box and held either 
a treat or a piece of chow in his/her hand in close proximity to his/her eyes.  For each 
trial, one experimenter held a treat and the other a piece of chow.  The animal was given 
10 trials per session in which position of experimenter, the position of the reward (treat) 
and which experimenter held the treat was block randomized, ensuring that the treat was 
located on each side an equal number of times, each experimenter appeared on both sides 
an equal number of times and each experimenter held the treat on 50% of the trials.  
Since these elements of the task were randomized, an animal could not use simple 
strategies such as choosing a particular side or experimenter to solve the problem.  The 
subject had to select the experimenter holding the treat by pulling the knob or cup of the 
box in front of them in order to receive that treat.  If the monkey selected the 
experimenter holding the chow, then it received the chow. Once the animal selected the 
experimenter holding the treat statistically more than expected by chance (p≤0.05, at least 
8/10 trials correct) for five consecutive sessions it was moved on to Experiment 1b.  
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Experiment 1b (Preferential selection of an experimenter after hiding a treat) 
 This experiment tested whether or not monkeys could remember an experimenter 
who had last held a desirable treat before hiding it and then select that experimenter using 
the box apparatus.  The procedure was similar to Experiment 1a, in which the animal was 
presented with both boxes, each box with an experimenter behind it holding a reward. 
However, it differed from Experiment 1a in that a monkey first saw the two 
experimenters, one holding a treat and the other holding a piece of chow, and then the 
experimenters placed the food items out of the animal’s view on the ground.  The 
experimenters then resumed their same positions, and the monkey was allowed to make a 
choice. The monkeys were given 10 trials per session to select the experimenter who 
initially held the treat prior to its being hidden. After the animal reliably selected the 
experimenter that held the desirable treat prior to being hidden, (p≤0.05, at least 8/10 
trials correct per session) for five consecutive sessions the monkey was moved on to 
Experiment 1c. 
Experiment 1c (Preferential selection of an experimenter after hiding a treat and 
switching locations) 
 This experiment tested whether or not the monkeys could remember which 
experimenter initially held a desirable treat after that experimenter hid the treat and then 
stood behind the other box.  In order to be successful, monkeys not only had to remember 
which experimenter had held the desirable treat, but also had to visually follow that 
experimenter as he/she moved location and then select that experimenter at the new 
location. The procedure for Experiment 1c was similar to the procedure for Experiment 
1b.  Once again, position of the experimenter and position of the treat was block 
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randomized.  However, it differed from the previous experiment in two important ways.  
After the experimenters placed the rewards on the ground, they switched locations behind 
the boxes on some trials (probes). Also, unlike previous experiments, monkeys were not 
trained to criterion.  Instead we tested their spontaneous ability to choose the correct 
experimenter by limiting them to only five sessions each consisting of 10 total trials.  Of 
those 10 trials, 4 included a location change (probe trials) and 6 did not.  
Results: Experiment 1a: The six animals that had successfully completed 
familiarization were moved on to Experiment 1a, in which they had to select the 
experimenter holding the desirable treat.  V38 eventually stopped responding and was 
dropped after she failed to respond for five consecutive sessions.  For the remaining five 
animals, 3E2, 6NS, ZA56, ZA65 and N02, a strong preference for the treat over the chow 
was established as all five animals reliably selected the experimenter holding the treat 
significantly more than would be predicted by chance (p≤0.05, at least 8/10 trials correct 
per session) for five consecutive sessions.  However, the monkeys required various 
numbers of sessions in order to reach criterion (See Figure 5).  These five monkeys were 
then moved on to Experiment 1b. 
 Experiment 1b: All five monkeys learned to choose the experimenter who last 
held the desirable food reward prior to it being hidden.  Once again, some animals took 
several sessions to learn to choose the correct experimenter, whereas others required only 
a few: 6NS= 5 sessions, 3E2= 5 sessions, ZA56= 5 sessions, ZA65=8 sessions and 
N02=25 sessions (See Figure 6).  The criterion for completion of this experiment was 
five consecutive days in which an animal chose the experimenter who last held the 
desirable treat significantly more than the experimenter who last held the chow.  
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 Experiment 1c: Only two of the five monkeys were able to reliably choose the 
experimenter who last held the desirable treat after he/she changed locations.  6NS and 
3E2 were the only subjects to complete this experiment.  They each chose the 
experimenter that last held the desirable treat significantly more than predicted by chance 
during the location change trials: 6NS (17/20 trials correct, p<0.01.) and 3E2 (16/20 trials 
correct, p<0.01.)  The three remaining animals, ZA65, ZA56 and N02, showed no signs 
of understanding that they were following the experimenter that last held the desirable 
treat after that experimenter had moved location.  It appeared that they were choosing 
experimenters randomly.  This was evident as they performed around chance level: ZA56 
(8/20 trials correct, p=0.868), ZA65 (6/20 trials correct, p=0.979), and N02 (11/20 trials 
correct, p=0.412) (See Figure 7).  However, all monkeys performed significantly above 
chance level on the trials that did not include a location change (standard trials): 6NS 
(24/30 trials correct, p<0.01.), 3E2 (26/30 trials correct, p<0.01.), ZA56 (24/30 trials 
correct, p<0.01), ZA65 (23/30 trials correct, p<0.01), and N02 (23/30 trials correct, 
p<0.01) (See Figure 8). 
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Figure 5 Sessions needed to reach criterion for Experiment 1a.  ZA56 required the least 
(13) and ZA65 required the most (29). 
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Figure 6 Sessions needed to reach criterion for Experiment 1b.  6NS, 3E2, and ZA56 all 
reached criterion in the least amount of sessions (5). 
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Experiment 1c Probe Trials
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Figure 7 Results for Experiment 1c.  Only two monkeys (6NS and 3E2) performed 
significantly above chance level (at least 14/20 trials correct, p≤0.05) on probe trials. 
Dashed line indicates chance level (p=0.05). 
Experiment 1c (Standard Trials)
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Figure 8 Results for standard trials within Experiment 1c.  All monkeys performed 
significantly above chance level (p<0.01), (significance= at least 20/30 trials correct, 
p≤0.05). Dashed line indicated chance level (p=0.05). 
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Discussion: Most monkeys readily learned to use the apparatus to select an 
experimenter.  As expected, monkeys clearly preferred an experimenter holding a treat.  
Furthermore, all five animals remembered which experimenter held the treat when the 
treat was hidden as long as the experimenters returned to the same boxes.  However, only 
two of the five monkeys were also successful on probe trials when the experimenters 
changed position after hiding the treat.  The poor performance of three of the monkeys 
(ZA56, ZA65, and N02) on the probe trials in Experiment 1c may indicate that instead of 
remembering which experimenter last held the desirable treat and following that 
particular experimenter to a new location, they were merely remembering the location 
where they last saw the treat.  It is important to note that although ZA56, ZA65 and N02 
did poorly on the trials involving a location switch, they all continued to perform 
significantly above chance levels on the trials in which the treats were placed out of view, 
but the experimenters did not change location during the same sessions. 
  Interestingly, the two animals (6NS and 3E2) that were successful in both 
Experiment 1b and Experiment 1c appeared to pay continuous attention to both 
experimenters and were less active overall than other monkeys and typically stayed at the 
front of the cage during a trial.  In contrast, the three animals that were unsuccessful 
appeared to pay less attention to the experimenters and frequently moved around the cage 
during a trial.   
 In order to better understand why Experiment 1c was difficult for some of the 
animals, two monkeys, ZA56 and ZA65, participated in a modified version of 
Experiment 1c, in which the treats were no longer dropped down on the ground out of the 
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subject’s view, but were placed on top of an inverted plastic cup still visible to the 
subject.  The cup was affixed to the wall facing the subject’s cage behind the 
experimenters.  The purpose was to reinstate attention to the task.  One at a time each 
experimenter turned and placed the treat on top of the cup and then changed location.  
Which experimenter placed his/her treat down first was randomly selected for each 
session.  In Experiment 1b, the treats were placed down out of the subject’s view but the 
experimenters did not move position until the trial was over.  We believed that since the 
treats were placed down out of the subject’s view and then the experimenters switched 
positions in the original procedure for Experiment 1c, the animals may have stopped 
attending to the experimenters and possibly thought the trial was over as it had been in 
Experiment 1b.  This possibility could account for their inability to follow the 
experimenter who last held the desirable treat.  Since the modified version of Experiment 
1c did not involve the placing the treats out of view or simultaneous movement of the 
experimenters (i.e. they moved one at a time), we believed the subjects’ would visually 
attend to the experimenters as they moved positions and consequently their performance 
would improve.  
 However, both animals performed around chance levels on the modified version 
of Experiment 1 Phase 2 (ZA56= (8/20 trials correct, p=0.868) and ZA65= (10/20 trials 
correct, p=0.588). Therefore, we concluded that although we succeeded on sustaining the 
monkeys’ attention on the task, they were merely making random choices with no 
apparent strategy (the two monkeys chose the experimenter who was closest to the treat 
only about 50% of the time).  Since the modified version of Experiment 1c did not lead to 
improved performance, the remaining animal who did poorly on the original version did 
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not receive sessions of the modified version and all monkeys were then moved on to 
Experiment 2.      
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The purpose of this experiment was to test whether or not rhesus monkeys could 
discriminate between an experimenter who looks at them as opposed to one that does not.  
If the monkeys understand that the eyes signify visual attention, then we would expect 
them to request a treat from the experimenter who does not have his/her vision occluded.  
In the previous experiment, two of the monkeys reliably selected the experimenter 
(responding correctly on location change trials) whereas the others may have merely 
tracked the treat.  If true, we then predicted that the two monkeys who had been 
successful on the location change portion of Experiment 1 would also perform better on 
Experiment 2 than the remaining three monkeys who failed the location change test.   
Subjects 
 The five female monkeys that completed Experiment 1b (6NS, 3E2, ZA56, ZA65, 
and N02) participated in Experiment 2.  See Table 2 for detailed subject information. 
Housing 
 The housing arrangements were the same as described previously for Experiment 
1.  All monkeys were tested in their homecages (see Figures 1-3). 
Apparatus 
 The two wooden boxes that had been used for Familiarization and Experiment 1 
were once again used (see Figure 4). 
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Data Analysis 
 All data in this study were analyzed using binomial probabilities to determine 
whether or not an animal selected the correct experimenter (i.e., the one looking at the 
monkey) significantly more than would be expected by chance.  When presented with the 
apparatus (2 boxes) with one experimenter behind each box, an animal had a 50% chance 
of choosing the correct experimenter.  An alpha level of 0.05 was the criterion for 
significant results.  
Experiment 2 Procedure 
 During this experiment, monkeys received 10 trials per session for a total of five 
sessions.  As described in Experiment 1b, two experimenters each stood behind a box.  
During the six standard trials, both experimenters looked at the monkeys.  However, one 
experimenter held up a treat whereas the other experimenter held up a piece of chow.  
Depending on the knob the monkeys pulled, they either received the treat or the chow.  
During this experiment, the monkeys also received four probe trials per session.  These 
trials differed from the ones described above in that both experimenters held a treat; 
however, only one experimenter was looking at the monkeys.  There were two probe 
conditions in which one experimenter either turned his/her head and eyes away from the 
animal (Probe 1, Figure 9) or covered his/her eyes with a white cotton blindfold (Probe 2, 
Figure 10).  During the blindfold probe, one experimenter used the cotton cloth to cover 
his/her eyes while the other experimenter used the cotton to cover his/her mouth in order 
to control for a novelty effect.  The treats were kept in the hands of the experimenters’, 
held near the face and were not placed down during a trial.  If a monkey chose the 
experimenter who could not see them (had his/her vision occluded) they did not receive a 
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treat.  For these trials, box location of the experimenter and which experimenter was 
looking toward the animal was block randomized. 
 
Figure 9 Probe 1- Head turn condition.        Figure 10 Probe 2- Blindfold condition. 
 
Results 
 Experiment 2 Probe trials.  All subjects visually examined both experimenters 
before making a selection.  When the performances of all animals were grouped together 
for both probe trial conditions, the group performance was significantly greater than that 
expected by chance; Probe 1- (M=8.2 trials correct), t(4)=4.00, *p=0.016) (See Figure 
11); Probe 2- (M=7.00 trials correct), t(4)=4.47, *p=0.011) (See Figure 12).  An 
examination of individual subject performance revealed that all of the monkeys 
performed significantly above chance on one probe condition.  However, no animal 
scored significantly above chance levels on both probe conditions.  Three monkeys 
scored significantly above chance levels on the head turn condition in which one 
experimenter faced away from the animal; 3E2 8/10 trials correct (p=0.05), ZA56 10/10 
trials correct (p<0.01) and ZA65 10/10 trials correct (p<0.01), but were not significantly 
above chance on the blindfold condition: 3E2 7/10 trials correct (p=0.172), ZA56 6/10 
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trials correct (p=0.377), and ZA65 6/10 trials correct (p=0.377).  The reverse pattern was 
observed for the two remaining monkeys.  Their performance was significantly above 
chance on the blindfold condition: N02 8/10 trials correct (p=0.05) and 6NS 8/10 trials 
correct (p=0.05), but not on the head turn condition: N02 7/10 trials correct (p=0.172) 
and 6NS 6/10 trials correct (p=0.377) (See Figure 13 for individual performances).  Also, 
all of the monkeys performed significantly above chance level on the standard trials 
within these sessions: 6NS 29/30 trials correct (p<0.01), 3E2 30/30 (p<0.01), ZA56 27/30 
trials correct (p<0.01), and ZA65 27/30 trials correct (p<0.01) (See Figure 14).   
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Figure 11 Group performance for Probe Trial 1: Head turn condition versus that 
expected by chance level. (M=8.2 trials correct), t(4)=4.00, *p=0.016). 
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Figure 12 Group performance for Probe Trial 2: Blindfold condition versus that expected 
by chance level. (M=7.00 trials correct), t(4)=4.47, *p=0.011). 
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Figure 13 Individual results for Probes 1 & 2. 3E2, ZA56 and ZA65 performed 
significantly above chance level (at least 8/10 trials correct, p≤ 0.05) on probe 1 (head 
turn), and 6NS and N02 performed significantly above chance level on probe 2 
(blindfolds). Dashed line indicates chance level (p=0.05).   
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Figure 14 Individual results for standard trials within Experiment 2 sessions.  All 
monkeys performed significantly above chance level (p<0.01). Dashed line indicates 
chance level (15/30 trials correct, p=0.05). 
 
Discussion 
 At the group level, monkeys appeared to understand both Experiment 2 probe trial 
conditions.  However, when broken down by individual performance, some monkeys 
performed significantly above chance on one condition, but not the other.  Also, it is 
important to note that no one monkey performed significantly above chance on both 
probe conditions, but every monkey performed above chance on one probe condition.  
Neither probe was superior to the other influencing performance inasmuch as 3 monkeys 
succeeded on one probe whereas two monkeys succeeded on the other. 
We had predicted that the two monkeys who had been successful on Experiment 
1c in following location change of the experimenter (6NS & 3E2) would perform better 
than the other monkeys who had been unsuccessful in following the experimenter.  
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Nonetheless, all five monkeys performed similarly, with each monkey attaining 
significance on one probe condition.  Furthermore, the two monkeys that succeeded in 
following the experimenter were affected differentially by the probe types with one 
performing better on the head turn condition and the other succeeding only on the 
blindfold condition. 
  The difference in performance between the monkeys cannot be attributed to age.  
Monkeys that solved the blindfold condition ranged in age from 2-20 years.  Those that 
solved the head turn condition ranged in age from 5-19 years.  
Interestingly, the two monkeys who were unsuccessful on Probe 1 (head turn 
condition) displayed similar behavior during that testing condition.  Both monkeys 
followed the gaze of the experimenter who turned his/her head away from the monkey.  
Both monkeys would then look at that experimenter and then look back in the 
experimenter’s gaze direction.  They would repeat this behavior until they chose an 
experimenter.  One possibility is that these monkeys may have been attempting to attract 
that experimenter’s attention.  Because the other probe condition (blindfolds) involved 
both experimenters facing toward the monkeys, there would be no need to attract an 
experimenter’s attention.   
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 These data suggest that rhesus macaques may understand the causal connection 
between seeing and knowing as they are able to differentiate between an experimenter 
looking at them as opposed to one that does not in order to receive a food reward.  
Success was achieved by decreasing the distance between the cue (face) and the hand 
holding the treat.  Previous studies have reported failure of nonhuman primates on tasks 
requiring the use of this ability (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a; Povinelli et al., 1991).  
However, most of these studies required primates to make a connection between the 
direction of gaze and a treat held in the hand at about waist level. Other research has 
shown that rhesus monkeys are affected by the spatial contiguity between the reward and 
the cue, with increasing distance associated with poorer performance (McClearn & 
Harlow, 1954; Meyer, Polidora, & McConnell, 1961; Miller & Murphy, 1964; Murphy & 
Miller, 1955).   
Our current study employed a modified testing paradigm in which the spatial 
arrangement of the reward and the cue was changed so that the reward (desirable treat) 
was held close to the cue (experimenters’ eyes) in order to ensure that the monkeys 
would focus their attention on these important components of the task.  Our procedure 
also minimized potential distractions because the two experimenters remained in the 
room throughout the testing procedure with minimal movement.  
In mental state tasks, the goal is to see whether monkeys possess the ability to 
determine the attentional focus of an organism such as a human and can use that 
information to gesture to the human who is looking at them.  We obtained positive results 
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from five rhesus monkeys on this type of task and believe that this suggests that rhesus 
monkeys understand that visual attention also equates to an underlying mental state of 
attention.  However, an alternative argument would suggest that the rhesus monkeys were 
merely making an association between forward facing eyes and receiving a reward.  This 
problem was discussed by Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) who noted the success of 
chimpanzees on their task was likely due to the presentation of many trials (>100) which 
may have led to rule-based learning (i.e. always pick the experimenter who is facing me).  
We minimized this risk by giving monkeys only five sessions of 10 trials each (only 20 of 
which were the actual probe trials; only 4 per session).  Based on many other kinds of 
tasks, 20 interspersed trials may be too few to enable rhesus monkeys to learn rules for 
this task (Harlow, 1949; Harlow, H.F., Harlow, M.K., Rueping, & Mason, 1960).  
Because all five rhesus monkeys were successful on at least one probe trial condition, we 
believe that our modified procedure is a more accurate test of seeing and knowing ability.  
These data support our hypothesis that previous failure was due to experimental design 
and not to the lack of this ability in rhesus monkeys.     
However, it is difficult to account for why monkeys only responded to one probe 
type and not the other.  This finding is not simply due to the fact that one probe type was 
easier than the other because three monkeys exhibited comprehension of the head turn 
condition (probe 1) but not the blindfold condition (probe 2) whereas two monkeys did 
the reverse.  It might be assumed that the head turn condition should be easier for two 
reasons.  First, head turning is a condition that rhesus monkeys would encounter in the 
wild with conspecifics, as well as in the laboratory setting with human experimenters.  
Second, the blindfolds are novel and may disrupt performance.  Human experimenters in 
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the Novak lab wear transparent face shields and not opaque facemasks; therefore, the 
novelty of the blindfold condition is greater than the head turn condition.  However, both 
experimenters were wearing the blindfolds on their face, and two monkeys actually 
performed better on the blindfold condition, making familiarity/ novelty an unlikely 
explanation of the findings.  Also, the two monkeys who succeeded on the blindfold 
condition, but not on the head turn condition, exhibited a behavior not seen in the other 
monkeys, in which they followed the gaze of the experimenter looking away.  It is 
possible that these monkeys were confused and their tendency to follow gaze may have 
interfered with their performance on that probe condition. 
Another possible explanation is that monkeys did not really learn to choose 
experimenters but instead followed the treat.  When tested on a memory task that 
required them to remember which experimenter last held a desirable treat after that 
experimenter changed locations; only two of the monkeys were successful.  The two 
animals that performed well on this experiment were both older animals and were less 
active during the testing procedure.  The younger animals often moved around the cage 
during testing and it is possible that they paid less attention while the experimenters 
changed location.  However, these monkeys did not perform better on the mental state 
task than the other monkeys and furthermore, one solved the head turn condition and not 
the blindfold condition whereas the other did the reverse.  
Another possibility is that performance could have been affected by the presence 
of other possibly more dominant animals in the testing room.  Rhesus monkeys have rigid 
dominance hierarchies and although each animal was tested in its own homecage, it could 
see other monkeys in the room.  Drea and Wallen (1999) found that when subordinate 
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rhesus monkeys were tested on a discrimination task in the presence of higher-ranking 
monkeys, they performed poorly even though they were successful previously when 
tested amongst similarly ranked members.  However, dominance effects seem unlikely to 
account for our findings.  All monkeys tested in this study not only responded 
significantly above chance on all standard trials, they also performed well on one of the 
probe types.  It is difficult to explain how dominance relationships would selectively 
affect the monkeys’ performance on some probe types and not others.   
 No comparison can be made at this time between males and females in order to 
determine whether or not a sex difference exists in this ability since only females learned 
to use the apparatus.  The main limitation of our study was the small sample size tested.  
Future investigations using this testing paradigm with larger subject pools including 
males and females as well as individuals of various ages may be able to better answer 
these questions. 
It has been argued that the above paradigm may not be the most ideal method of 
testing of seeing and knowing ability because cooperation and food sharing is rarely seen 
within rhesus monkey troops and, therefore, the testing paradigm asks these animals to 
act in an unnatural manner.  Some researchers believe that a more appropriate testing 
paradigm involves a situation that an animal may encounter in the wild.  Several recent 
studies have employed such a strategy in which a competition task is used in order to test 
whether or not non-human primates understand what another organism sees based on 
where that organism is attending.  By constructing an “ecologically relevant” test, in 
which rhesus macaques had the opportunity to “steal” a treat from one of two 
experimenters, Flombaum and Santos (2005) obtained results that agree with ours and yet 
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differ from earlier studies with rhesus macaques that utilized cooperation tasks with 
human experimenters (Povinelli et al., 1991).  The Flombaum and Santos task required 
the monkeys to use seeing and knowing ability to obtain a reward in a similar manner to 
stealing food from a conspecific.  Flombaum and Santos’ study was conducted on the 
island of Cayo Santiago where 1500 monkeys are provisioned and range freely over the 
island.  Their testing method took into account that rhesus monkeys are a gaze aversive 
species and direct eye contact is often viewed as a threat.  The monkeys were presented 
with two experimenters both of whom faced toward the animal.  However, only one 
experimenter could see whereas the other could not, either because his/her eyes were 
occluded by use of a barrier, or closed, or the head was turned away from the animal.  
The experimenter who could see was looking at the treat while facing toward the 
monkey.  If the monkeys had the ability to discriminate between experimenters and 
therefore determine which one could see them, it was expected that the monkeys would 
choose to “steal” take the treat from the experimenter who could not see the monkey.  In 
all testing conditions the monkeys choose to steal the treat from the non-looking 
experimenter significantly more than by chance alone.   
Two possible mechanisms could be at work to explain the subjects’ performance 
on the task.  The first is a lower-level explanation that the forward gaze of the 
experimenter in the animal’s direction was simply more threatening than the one who 
was not looking.  The second is a higher-level explanation in which the animals 
understood that the non-looking experimenter could not see them and therefore it was 
safer for them to take the treat from this experimenter because he/she was less likely to 
react.  The lower-level explanation was deemed unlikely by the authors based on the fact 
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that during all conditions both experimenters exhibited the same body posture and in 
some cases, such as the closed eyes condition, the occlusion of vision was very subtle.  
Therefore, Flombaum and Santos (2005) came to the conclusion that rhesus monkeys are 
able to attribute perception to human experimenters.  
However, there were some limitations to the Flombaum and Santos study.  Each 
monkey received only one trial and therefore, we cannot conclude that a monkey’s 
strategy for obtaining a treat from the experimenters would have been persistent.  
Furthermore, approximately 300 monkeys were dropped from the study due to various 
reasons such as: “interference, experimenter error, previous testing, early approach or 
disinterest” (Flombaum & Santos, 2005), which raises questions about the reliability of 
the testing setup.      
Rhesus monkeys are not the only non-human primate species to be exposed to a 
competitive testing paradigm. Chimpanzees were tested using dominant and subordinate 
group members as competitors for food items (Hare, Call, and Tomasello, 2001).  The 
subordinate animals were always able to witness where the treat was placed while the 
dominant witnessed the baiting only on some trials.  After the baiting procedure took 
place, both animals were allowed into an enclosure that held a visible and non-visible 
treat (from the dominant animal’s perspective).  It was postulated that if the subordinate 
animal understood what the dominant could or could not see it would retrieve the hidden 
treat more than the visible treat.  Indeed, subordinates were more likely to approach a 
baited location that the dominant animal had not seen the baiting of and were less likely 
to approach a baited location the dominant animal had witnessed the baiting of.  The 
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authors concluded that this experiment supports the notion that chimpanzees are able to 
recognize what another animal has or has not seen (Hare et al., 2001).   
Although the experimental design of the aforementioned studies differs from our 
testing paradigm, the results support our hypothesis that rhesus monkeys have the ability 
to understand the causal connection between seeing and knowing, which enables them to 
choose between an experimenter who is looking at them versus one who is not.  It may be 
the case that the competition paradigm is a more appropriate test for monkeys in a free-
ranging wild environment, as the rhesus monkeys were in the Flombaum and Santos 2005 
study, because they are unfamiliar with humans providing treats.  In contrast, the 
monkeys in our laboratory and in most laboratory environments are familiar with 
receiving treats from humans.  Our monkeys receive a daily morning treat handed to 
them by various staff members.  Therefore, our testing paradigm, which involves the 
solicitation of treats from human experimenters looking at them, may be more suitable 
for those monkeys. 
        In summary, rhesus macaques can use a communication apparatus to select 
experimenters. They are also able to choose between experimenters holding different 
reward items.  When the items are placed out of view, they can remember which 
experimenter last held a desirable treat.  Some rhesus monkeys can even remember which 
experimenter last held the desirable treat after that experimenter has changed location.  In 
contrast to previous results from other testing paradigms, our results provide suggestive 
evidence for seeing and knowing ability in rhesus macaques.  Therefore, we conclude 
that our procedure is a more accurate method for testing seeing and knowing ability in 
laboratory housed primates.  Further research involving a larger number of animals is still 
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needed in order to tease apart specific issues that may affect the performance of these 
animals. 
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